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THE EXPROPRIATION CLIMATE i A STUDY OF DYNAMIC MEASURES
Perhaps no other subject in the realm of international
management is so often mentioned and yet so seldom rigorously
analyzed as the subject of expropriation and nationalization in
less developed countries (LDC). It seems that while most popular
articles dealing with investment opportunities in LDC's mention
either the occurence of past expropriations or the likelihood of
future actions, a search of the literature produces little in
the way of material which might help the operating manager assess
the risk of expropriation in a particular country at a particular
point in time. The need for a technique which would allow ex-
propriation risk to be analyzed together with the various com-
mercial risks associated with a foreign direct investment is in-
deed real, and the benefits of an accurate method would accrue not
only to the direct investor. The recipient country stands to gain
as well from a reliable method of expropriation risk evaluation,
for by properly assessing risks, an investor might be convinced
that an investment is viable despite his possible previous guess
that the risks were just too high. Proper risk assessment, then,
can be viewed as helping both the investor make more profitable
investments and the LDC attract needed development capital. The
purpose of this paper, then, is to take a small step in the direc-
tion of expropriation risk analysis by examining the behavior of
a few key economic and political variables in the time span immedi-
ately preceeding the expropriations of the 1960's.

DEFINITIONS
Before going very far, however, it seems necessary to agree
upon a working definition of expropriation and outline the way in
which the term is to be used in this paper. For purposes of
simplicication, expropriation will be used to describe any formal
taking of property whether or not compensation is paid. Thus the
term expropriation will be used to include acts of confiscation,
nationalization, and socialization -- terms which are often used
interchangeably with expropriation, yet have much more limited
2
meanings. Confiscation is the formal taking of property, or
expropriation, without compensation, and strictly speaking all
expropriations carried out before compensation has been decided
could be classified as confiscations. Confiscation has a dis-
tinctly pejorative connotation, however, and therefore will not
be used since eventual compensation in expropriation cases is not
to be a factor in this paper.
Two other terms often used interchangeably with expropriation
are nationalization and socialization. While both terms refer to
the formal taking or forced sale of property, these terms tell
something about the reasons behind the seizure or sale. Nation-
alization refers to the seizure or forced sale of property for the
purpose of limiting control of such property to nationals of the
host country. Thus both governmental agencies and private local
citizens could become the new owners of a nationalized property.
Socialization, on the other hand, means that the property taken has
been reserved exclusively for the public sector, and private
capital, either local or foreign, is to be excluded.
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alization and socialization fall under the general heading of ex-
propriation since a formal taking of property is involved in both
actions, and to eliminate any definitional problems, the term ex-
propriation will be used throughout this paper.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
A search of the literature on expropriation reveals that most
of the work in the area has been devoted to questions of compensa-
tion and the initial legal basis for the expropriation act. The
list of legal articles is much too long to mention and is, in any
case, outside the scope of interest for this paper, for here the
main point is the examination of factors which could possibly lead
to expropriation rather than a review of courses of action open
to the investor after the fact of expropriation. A good review
of recent legal action, however, can be found in Monroe Leigh's
presentation "Expropriation of Foreign-Owned Investment -- Recent
Trends," delivered at the Southwestern Legal Foundation Symposium
on International Business in the summer of 1972.-* A review of
some of the relevant expropriation laws themselves can be found
in Andreas Lowenfeld's Expropriation in the Americas.
The search for material which might help assess the risk of
expropriation in an operating situation produces only a limited
number of sources. Lee Charles Nehrt, in The Political Climate
for Private Foreign Investment , sets forth the hypothesis that
the risk of expropriation in a particular country can be evalu-
ated by an accurate analysis of the
t

.Jf_
1. Policy statements of political leaders and the government
2. Actions of the government, favorable and unfavorable
3. Historical context within which the statements and
actions took placed
Nehrt goes on to apply his model in the three North African
countries of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, and the apparent
success of the model in analyzing the political climate for foreign
investment might seem to recommend the model to operating managers.
The problem, however, is that the definitions of relevant policy
statements, actions, and historical context are so grossly sub-
jective as to allow almost limitless flexibility in the output of
the model. The intrinsically subjective nature of the model, when
coupled with the vast amount of research necessary to collect and
update the relevant policy statements, actions, and historical
context seems to limit the usefulness of the model as a planning
tool for the operating manager.
The analysis of the political climate of the host country is
commonly mentioned as an important part of the planning process
designed to evaluate potential sites for foreign direct investment.
Farmer and Richman in International Business! An Operational Thtor.v
propose a matrix of local and international variables which in-
fluence the investment decision, and an analysis of the political-
legal invironment of the direct investment is an integral part of
their matrix. Unfortunately, no specific mention is made of ex-
propriation risk, and no factor or combination of factors is
suggested as an aid to the analysis of expropriation risk.
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An effort to define the components of expropriation risk is
made by Stefan Roback in his article "Political Riski Identifica-
tion and Assessment." Addressing the broader question of politi-
cal risk, its elements, and its consequences (of which expropriation
is only one possible consequence), Robock suggests that "political
stability" is too broad and ill defined a concept to use as a
factor in analyzing political risk (and therefore expropriation
risk), and he feels that ideology and continuity of philosophy
are probably much more influential. Frequent changes of govern-
ment may be unimportant if the basic attitude of each government
toward foreign capital remains the same, and therefore , only
ideological changes may influence expropriation risk.
Robock relies heavily upon political struggles between com-
peting local pressure groups and their international alliances
to describe the generation of political risk, but he also mentions
the role played by the firm as being a contributing factor. Area
of operation, such as natural resources, or field of activity,
such as banking, can make a particular foreign firm especially
7
vulnerable to political risk.'
The actual analysis of expropriation risk by means of the
elements suggested by Robock, although possible, would appear
difficult because of the lack of clearly defined relationships
and analytical data as supporting evidence. Robock's suggested
method of forecasting- is very similar to the method described by
Q
Robert Stobaugh in "How to Analyze Foreign Investment Climates."
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The method entales the creation of a decision tree with each branch
reflecting a possible course of action on the part of the local
environment which may or may not lead to expropriation. The final
output of the method is a number forecast of the probability of
expropriation, or other restrictive practice, if that is what the
model is designed to predict. The major problem with the model,
however, is that both the branch elements and probabilities are
undefined, and presumably the international manager is left free
to define his own relationships and probabilities. Whether the
model merely quantifies an educated guess is therefore open to
question.
By far the most comprehensive work on the analysis of ex-
propriation risk is an unpublished Ph.D. thesis by John F. Truitt
entitled Expropriation of Private Foreign Investment! A Framework
To Consider the Post World War II Experience of British and
American Investors . In his thesis Truitt not only creates a system
of factors which he suggests influence expropriation risk, but he
then tests the factors against the experience of expropriated
American and British firms. Truitt's framework is divided into
two major areas, the host nation characteristics and the investor
characteristics, on the premise that expropriation risk is a
function of both sets of characteristics rather than only one of
the two. The set of host nation characteristics are the ones of
specific interest here since the evaluation of expropriation risk
and the eventual prediction of expropriation requires the formal
definition of the relevant local factors and their behavior before
expropriation. Below is Truitt's set of 12 host nation characteristics!
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10
li
12
Gross National Product Set
Ideology of Ascendent Elite
Public Sector/Private Sector Mix
Political Stability-Colonial Heritage & Independence
Political Instability-Continuity of Post Independence
Governments
Legal System-Internal
Legal System-External
Balance of Payments
The Domestic Entrepreneur
View of Foreigners
Internal Political Crisis
Communist Bloc Economic Assistance
While Truitt does not claim to have statistically validated
the importance of his factors, he does produce a set of 3 factors
which he feels are more strongly indicative of high risk than any
of the others. These factors are the GNP set (N^), a combination
of elite ideology, public/private sector mix and the domestic
entrepreneur (Np, N~, and N
g ),
and an internal political crisis
requiring some type of drastic action (i.e., nationalization) to
maintain the government in power ( N ],]_)» Both "types of political
stability, view of foreigners, and balance of payments (N^, N^,
N
fl
, N ln ) are judged to have medium importance, and the legal
systems and Communist aid activity (Ng dropped, N ? and N 1? )
are found to have the least value.

The problem with the Truitt classification scheme, however, is
that the process is essentially a static one, with no defined
dynamic relationships which might enable the observer to trans-
late a change in any of the factors into a change in the expro-
priation risk. The task of this paper, then, is to examine how
some of these, or similar, country variables, behave just prior
to an expropriation.
For purposes of simplification the analyzed set of expropri-
ations is limited to those actions which are catalogued by the
U.S. State Department study Nationalization, Expropriation, and
Other Takings of United States and Certain Other Foreign Property
Since I960 (RECS-14) of November 30, 1971. The study covers events
from January 1, I960 to June 30, 1971# and its thoroughness im-
plies that rather than a sample of the expropriations in that time
period, the study presents the entire population. The study cata-
logues some 70 expropriations or forced sale events in some 3^
countries involving hundreds of individual private firms. Four
of these countries (Kenya, Malawi, Tunisia, and Israel) have been
eliminated from this study either because the property in question
is non-industrial (i.e., religious or agricultural) or the nature
of the ownership change has been so gradual and well received (Kenya
that the forceful, unilateral application of sovereign power im-
plied by expropriation seems inappropriate as a description of
events
. In addition, the expropriations involved in the Communist
revolution in Cuba have also been eliminated so that the strong
ideological flavor of those expropriations would not influence the
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rest of the data. The remaining thirty countries listed in Table I
along with the dates of the expropriation actions make up the points
for which the data presented in this study has been collected.
THE STUDY
As stated previously the main purpose of this paper is to
investigate the behavior of some key economic and political variables
in the time period immediately preceeding the expropriation event.
The idea is to produce a set of reliable empiracal data as a first
step in the direction of formulating a method for accurately
analyzing expropriation risk. As can be seen from the preceeding
review of the literature, no such hard data base exists, and some
of the key concepts which have traditionally been related to
expropriation risk have never been tested.
The central concept around which the variables used here
have been selected is the premise that expropriations are carried
out by governments when they are weak or feel threatened. Al-
though not explicitly stated, the idea of weakness or threat is
central to Robock's thesis that social unrest and competing ideol-
ogies are a prime cause of political risk and hence expropriation
risk. Truitt*s choice of variables, specifically political
instability, balance of payments crisis, and internal political
crisis, also suggests an underlying theme of weakness and response
to threat as a motivation for expropriation. The idea of threat,
as suggested by the choice of variables, can be combined with
the concept of general weakness alone, for a threat only becomes
truly viable if the government is, or feels itself to be, weak.
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Expropriation, then, becomes a possible reaction to weakness, a
response to a threat, which has acted as a trigger such as social
unrest, balance of payments crisis or other political or economic
threat. The specific threat or current crisis may be the cause
of governmental reaction, but the weakening process which has
made that threat viable has been going on for some time. If
a set of variables which would monitor this trend toward weakness
could be created, it might be possible to generate a warning of an
increasing expropriation risk. Such a warning might be more valu-
able than a perfectly reliable description of the potential threat
which would actually trigger expropriation. By the time the trig-
gering threat is on the horizon, the time for possible reaction
on the part of foreign direct investors has practically disappeared,
whereas if the trend leading to a higher risk of expropriation had
been spotted, defensive action might still have been possible.
THE VARIABLES
The variables chosen for the study are the final product of
a period of sorting and simplification involving literally hundreds
of possible relevant choices. Five economic variables and one
political variable split into four dimensions have been chosen for
observation because they seem to have the best a priori chance of
having some predictive value. These variables are also fairly
easy to gather and manipulate, factors which are critical if they
are to be easily incorporated into a working model of risk analy-
sis readily usable by the operating international manager.
The first economic variable chosen is the Gross National
Product per capita, a fairly standard measure of economic develop-
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ment and one which is fairly easy to monitor. Truitt incorporated
a measure of GNP per capita into his own model and postulated
that a higher propensity to expropriate is to be found among countriei
with the lowest GNP per capita measure scores. While there appears
to be value in this hypothesis, another examination of Table I
(the expropriating countries) illustrates that all the countries-
are less developed countries with very low GNP per capita. There-
fore, the static measure of GNP per capita has been overlooked in
favor of the dynamic measure of economic performance i annual per-
centage change in GNP per capita at constant prices.
The hypothesis relating to this variable is that the lower
the rate of growth, the more likely is the possibility of expro-
priation. It is assumed that a declining rate of growth in GNP
per capita in the years prior to expropriation would indicate a
worsening economic situation which might weaken the regime in
power and raise the risk of expropriation.
The second variable is the rate of inflation in the consumer
price index. This measure is included to monitor the success of
local government's economic performance. Robock mentions "social
unrest" as a contributing factor in political risk, and Truitt
places great weight on the emergence of a domestic political crisis
12
in the host country prior to expropriation. Both these measures
are difficult to quantify and monitor for an operating manager,
and so inflation has been substituted under the assumption that
high inflation most certainly could be associated with social un-
rest and political crisis. The hypothesis relating to inflation,
then, is that high and increasing rates of inflation in the years
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prior to expropriation increase the risk of expropriation.
The third economic variable is the percentage change on a
yearly basis of the net goods and services traded by each country
and as reported to the International Monitary Fund. Both the IMF
annual Balance of Payments Handbook and the monthly International
Financial Statistics provide a ready source for this and the next
two economic variables. The object of including changes in net
trade figures is to attempt to gauge the improvement or deteriora-
tion over time in a country's balance of payments position. The
rationale for including a balance of payments measure is the idea
that foreign direct investors, as consumers of foreign exchange
for new capital imports and profit repatriation, can often strain
a developing country's balance of payments position. Truitt also
includes a balance of payments measure in his study, but rather
than follow his approach of concentrating on a single crisis period
as the expropriation trigger, the hypothesis here is that a
worsening trade situation over time will increase the overall risk
of expropriation. The predicted relationship is then one which
has a larger and larger percentage of the sample showing trade
decreases as the year of expropriation approaches.
The fourth economic variable is the annual rate of change of
private direct and long-term investment flowing into the country
in question. The rationale behind a choice of direct investment
flows, beyond a desire on the one hand to investigate the behavior
of these flows before an expropriation, is the idea that foreign
domination of the local economy is an important variable. Truitt
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mentions the public/private Sector mix and the opinions of the
domestic entrepreneur as variables having a strong influence on
the expropriation decision, and Robock mentions a similar relation-
ship. 13
Annual percentage change figures have been used to make the
figures comparable on a cross-national basis, and the change
figure is felt to better represent the changing impact of foreign
capital over time than a measure of static investment levels. The
proposed relationship is one which connects a rising rate of pri-
vate direct and long-term investment with an increased chance of
expropriation. High rates of foreign capital inflow might, there-
fore, be associated with increasing foreign domination of the local
economy.
The last economic variable is what the IMF refers to as
unrequited government transfers. The annual percentage change
figure has again been used, and the measure itself represents
direct grants to the local government and is therefore directly
related to the idea of foreign aid. Since unrequited transfers
do not include loans, they unfortunately do not represent the
entire foreign aid picture. The IMF figures which cover govern-
ment loans, however, also include loans from such private inter-
national aid sources as the World Bank and regional development
banks. The transfer figure has therefore been used by itself as
an attempted measure of foreign aid on a nation to nation basis,
excluding the effects of aid from the international institutions.
The importance of foreign aid is also supported by Truitt and
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Robock, and the hypothesis to be examined is that increasing foreign
aid might be related to an increasing possibility of expropriation
by an implied decline in the importance of private capital as a
development vehicle. Unfortunately, no figures readily available
for all the countries in the study enable an examination that a
shift in the origin of the foreign aid (East Bloc vs. Western Nations)
might have upon expropriations, and analysis of this factor is
to be left for future study.
The main political variable is a change in government leader-
ship or regime, and the variable is divided into four dimensions.
Political change is included in the study to examine the hypothesis
that political instability, in terms of frequency of regime change,
14
is related to expropriations, a connection doubted by Robock.
Any given change is classified four ways, as being either regular
or irregular and either left or right ideologically. The dimensions
of the change should shed light on the premise that a leftward
moving regime is more likely to expropriate than a regime which
has moved to the right, and the regular/irregular dimension is
designed to determine whether a coup d f etat is more likely than
an elected change to produce an expropriation. The distinction
of regular/irregular can sometimes be quite subjective, but the
scale in use here is one of the presence or absence of the use of
force of arms to implement a change of regime. Thus a peaceful
change within a military dictatorship would be a regular change and
an army coup, even to restore popular government, would be classi-
fied as irregular.

15-
The rating of change on an ideological scale is also a com-
plicated, highly subjective process, but the problem here is simpli-
fied since incoming regimes are judged only against their prede-
cessors rather than on some type of international scale of ideologi-
cal allegiance. The directions of the political spectrum used
here follow the schema used by Lerner in The Passing of Traditional
Society with left indicating an overriding concern for social
problems and the right primarily concentrating on the glory of
the nation state. ** Left is also used to imply a greater degree
of participatory input in the process of government while right
is used to denote a more authoritarian type of rule. The actual
scoring of regime changes on this four-dimensional framework has
been accomplished by the use of expert opinion but mainly by con-
sulting reference works devoted to the countries in question.
The references themselves are listed in the bibliography.
There are thus three economic variables which are intended
to measure directly the economic strength or weakness of the ex-
propriating countries in the years prior to expropriation.
Annual rates of real (deflated) GNP per capita, growth, inflation,
and trade growth in goods and services are designed to measure
just how well the economies of these countries have been behaving.
The variables designed to measure investment flow and foreign aid,
on the other hand, have been included to determine just what did
happen in these areas before expropriation, more for the purposes
of explanation than to validate any particular theory.
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The political variable, regime change, is designed to answer
a number of questions. How important is an ideological change in
expropriation? How long have the regimes been in power? Is
frequency of regime change important? Is a coup d'etat more likely
to produce an expropriation than an elected change? Hopefully,
the data will enable these and other questions to be answered.
THE METHOD
A time series method of data collection is used in this study,
because one of the goals is the preservation of details which
might be lost by merely averaging the data over the time span of
the study (1960-1971). There is, therefore, no one time period
for which data has been collected; rather the variables have
been monitored in each of the five years preceeding each expropri-
ation act in an effort to capture the dynamics of the situation.
For the thirty countries listed in Table I, forty-nine separate
expropriation actions can be identified as having occurred during
the period under examination. These actions are separated on an
annual basis, and the relevant economic and political data has
been assembled for the year of expropriation and each of the four
preceding year*.- This data is displayed in Tables II, III, IV, V,
and VI. By so centering on the expropriation action as the focus
of the data collection effort, it is hoped that the influence of
changing regional and international economic and political cycles
has been minimized.
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THE RESULTS
The first factor to be examined is regime change, the measure
of political stability. Table VII shows the number of changes in
each of the five years preceding the expropriations, and there
are two factors which appear to predominate. The first is the
fact that the number of regime changes peaked the year before the
expropriations, which could support the hypothesis that political
instability, as measured by the frequency of regime changes, is
an important variable in evaluating expropriation risk. A second
result is the slight leftward movement of the changes themselves.
Some 59% of the changes were to the left while only 41% were to
the right. Proof for the hypothesis that governments which have
moved to the left are more likely to expropriate would seem shaky
at best given such a small difference, but a different principle
of examination produces drastically different results.
By reviewing the data the character of the last governmental
change preceding each expropriation can be determined and is dis-
played in Table VIII. Here governments which have moved to the
left outnumber those shifting to the right by almost 4 to 1.
The message here seems fairly clean that a leftward shift in the
leadership of a country is much more closely associated with ex-
propriations than moves to the right. The almost 50/50 split
between regular and irregular regime changes appears to remove
this variable from the realm of possible expropriation predictors,
indicating that faith placed by the foreign investor in a military
coup as less likely to expropriate is perhaps misplaced.
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A further analysis of the political change data produces an
extremely interesting result. An investigation of the length of
time the expropriating government has been in power produces the
data presented in Table IX. The implications of these longevity
figures are important because they tend to discount rather heavily
the notion that political instability is related to expropriations.
Only 2?# of the governments acted to expropriate within their first
year of office meaning that in almost 3/4 of the cases the foreign
investor had over a year after a governmental change to formulate
his plans. Equally striking is the fact that only 49% of the ex-
propriation actions took place in the first 2 years of a regime
with over half of the actions taking place more than 2 years after
a regime change. The time lags appear to be significant, for
rather than supporting the notion that political instability is
related to expropriation, they suggest the opposite notion that
political stability might play more of a role.
The bivariate nature of the regime longevity figures of
Table IX, with half of the countries acting to expropriate within
two years, suggests that different mechanisms might be at work
in each half of the sample. In order to investigate this hypo-
thesis the assembled economic data has been analyzed in three
groups » for all of the expropriation situations together, for
those which occurred within two years of a regime change and for
those which occurred more than two years after a regime change.
The distribution of GNP per capita growth over the five years
preceding the expropriations is displayed in Table X. For the
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sample as a wr.cie, tre dowr.ward trend of 3!fF per capita growth
figures seems to support the hypothesis of action froi a positior
of weakness. A 3iowdiwr. In the economic growth :f a. country as
measured by SUP per capita) f while not conclusive proof : :" eocr.cmio
deterioration, certainly pcir.-3 in that iirection.
The fairly clear dowr.w5.r0 trerr* of the aggregate fir-res see- =
to lose much of its r.ear.ir.g, howeweri when the saaple Is iirided
into long-term and shcrt-ter- regi-e types. -*e fir-res for ootl
long-term and short-tem regi-es are so divergent and the sowenents
so erratic that any attempt to find aeaning Ln the figures say
create more problems than they wculd solve. Z'r.e overriding im-
pression of this divided lata format i howeverj 1= that support
for the action from weakness hypothesis is not as string as sight
be expected. In fact, one could point to the rising Z-N? :er capita
growth rate in the last few years ::" both the lata subsets as
support for the opposite hypothesis. Thus the growth rate im-
provement in the last two years or" the short-tors regi-es and ir.
the last three out of four years for the longer term regimes oculd
be taken to indicate an economic Improvement strengthening the
countries involved and allcwir.g expropriation action fros a positioi
of strength.
This lack of firs support for the action fros reakness Hypo-
thesis is repeated In the figures for rates of ir. flati or., i— s-
trated in Table XI. Ef Lt Is assumed that ftigJ) rates of inflation
would contribute to the social tnres rtiic* Robock feels elewates
the risk of expropriation! one sight axpect the rates of Inflation
in the expropriating countries tc or to Bxpropriation.
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In fact the opposite is the case. The inflation figures, though
high, decrease in each of the three years leading up to and in-
cluding expropriation. The lowering inflation seems to indicate
that the regimes, while not necessarily responsible for the decline,
might at least take credit for the improvement. The thrust of
the data is a suggestion of a strengthening political picture and
contradiction rather than support for the action from weakness
hypothesis.
The performance of the balance of payments measure of net goods
and services is illustrated in Table XII. Because of the high
variation of the annual growth figures (from to plus or minus
several thousand percent) Table XII represents not the growth
rates themselves, but the percentage of the cases having a posi-
tive growth rate. Some detail is undoubtedly lost in such a presen-
tation, but given the large swings in the data, the value of the
detail so lost can be legitimately questioned. The results of
Table XII are striking, to say the least. While the performance
of the sample as a whole indicates an improvement in the year just
prior to expropriation (in line with the strength hypothesis),
the divided sample diverges drastically.
The short-term regime cases exhibit a steady improvement in
the net goods and services picture (if the earliest year, T-4,
is neglected in both cases), while the opposite prevails for the
long-term regime cases. Thus a worsening trade situation, signi-
fying a deteriorating: balance of payments position, is exhibited
only by those countries with regimes in power for two or more
years prior to expropriation. It would seem that only half the
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sample supports the hypothesis of expropriation action from a
position of weakness, if a deterioration in a nation's trade
picture can be said to contribute to weakness. The slight drop
in the trade measure in the year of expropriation for the short-
term regimes might be said to indicate a possible weakening, but
the main thrust of the data suggests two completely different
mechanisms involved in the divergence. A full analysis of the
reasons for the divergence is beyond the scope of this short in-
vestigation, but the fact that such a divergence exists raises
serious doubts as to the ability of the action from weakness
hypothesis to explain the timing of expropriations. Surely the
steady improvement for the countries with short-term regimes
cannot be taken to indicate weakness, and yet one might realisti-
cally expect that the newest regimes might be the weakest.
Curiously, the opposite hypothesis, that of action from strength,
might serve as a better explanation for the actions of the short-
term regimes. A steadily improving trade picture may so strengthen
the economic picture of a country that future foreign investment
may not seem as important as it once did. A new regime might,
therefore, feel strong enough to carry out expropriations, a
course of action which might have been avoided given less favorable
economic data.
The divergence of the trade patterns in the two sets of
countries, by highlighting the difference between the short-term
and long-term expropriating regimes, actually seems to help the
cause of expropriation risk analysis rather than hinder it. The
fact that longer term regimes have been in power for more than
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two years before an expropriation means that firms operating in
these countries had sufficient time to become accustomed to the
regimes and learned to predict their probable future actions.
This length of time to develop a familiarity with the regime
implies that the firms were not taken by complete surprise by the
eventual decision to expropriate. Franklin Root provides support
for this suggestion when he reports that one of his studies found
that the expropriated firms did indeed receive some warning of
the impending action.
The only situation where major uncertainty is involved, then,
is immediately after a regime change when the lifetime and policies
of the new regime are still uncertain. The suggested predictive
technique involves an examination of the trend in trade figures
as measured by the IMF net goods and services. Since expropriations
occurring within two years of a regime change took place in
countries with an improving trade measure (on average), a deter-
iorating trade picture in the country in question could suggest
a low risk of expropriation following a regime change.
The behavior of private foreign capital and foreign aid
flows is shown in Tables XIII and XIV. The presentation of the
data is in the same form used for the net goods and servicesi
the data represents the proportion of the sample which exhibited
an increase in the measure in that particular year. While the
general trend for private investment is down while the trend of
aid La up as the year of expropriation approaches the movements
are erratic and difficult to characterize.
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The downward drift of private investment flows might be
said to refute the relationship previously postulated that high
investment rates would be associated with expropriation. This is
because of pressure by local entrepreneurs and other local forces
to slow the flow of foreign capital out of fear of competition
or domination of the local economy by foreign businessmen. The
downward drift might be more profitably associated with a per-
ception of increased risk on the part of foreign capital sources.
The fact remains, however, that if the perception of increased
expropriation risk on the part of foreign capital owners does
account for the higher rates of capital withdrawal, one could
reasonably expect large capital outflows before an expropriation.
Foreign exchange restrictions on the part of the host countries
could explain the lack of massive private capital withdrawals
(a detailed examination of local foreign exchange restrictions
is beyond the scope of this study), but in any case the data does
not suggest any large private capital flight. This lack of
decisive capital movement could be an indication that private
foreign investors had not properly assessed the risk of expropri-
ation.
The slight rise in foreign aid represented in Table XIV seems
to fit with the hypothesis that increasing aid might be associated
with risk of expropriation because foreign aid could lessen the
dependence on foreign private development capital. In fact, the
rise in the foreign aid measure, when coupled with the fall in
private investment, may indicate that this type of parallel
movement is an indication of higher risk of expropriation. An
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increasing rate of foreign aid could be viewed as compensating for
an outflow of private capital, and lessening the value of private
capital as an ingredient in the economic development formula.
Such a perception of a diminished role for private capital could
indeed lead to a higher risk of expropriation.
CONCLUSIONS
The goal of this study as initially stated was to examine
the behavior of certain economic and political variables in
the time period preceding expropriations. The results of the study
are displayed in Tables II through XIV; the actual behavior of the
variables may seem to raise more questions than the data can answer.
The overall impression, however, is that this particular set of
variables lends only limited support to the hypothesis that ex-
propriations are carried out by countries from a position of
weakness. In fact, the data often seems to support the opposite
hypothesis, that of action from a position of strength. The im-
provement in GNP per capita growth rates in the long-term regime
countries, the general decline in inflation, and the improvement
in trade for the short-term regime countries can all be cited
as support for the opposing hypothesis. Indeed, action from
strength has a good deal of theoretical value when it is realized
that the act of expropriation leaves a less developed country open
to retaliation from the capital exporting countries. The less
developed country might not be willing to force this retaliation
unless it felt itself to be dealing from a position of strength*
and the long list of expropriating countries, including as it does
about half of the Third World countries, lends support to Kindle-
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berger's thesis that the balance of power appears to be shifting
from the side of the foreign investor to the side of the local
17
country. If such a shift is indeed taking place, and the
current international basic commodity shortage seems to lend even
more support, then one might expect to see even more expropriations
in the future. With this pessimistic prognosis in mind, it is
hoped that the relationship uncovered between short-term regimes
and an improving trade picture as well as the other data presented
here can be of some use in the continuing effort to accurately
assess the risk of expropriation.
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TABLE I
LIST OF COUNTRIES AND DATES OF EXPROPRIATION ACTIONS
Country
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Ecuador
Guyana
Haiti
Mexico
Peru
Algeria
Iraq
Libya
Date
1963
1969
1971
1959
1962
1970
1971
1970
1971
1964
1960
1965
1967
1969
1968
1969
1970
1967
1969
1971
1961
1963
1964
1969
1970
1971
Country

TABLE II - DATA FOR YEAR T , YEAR OF EXPROPRIATION FVENT
Bntage Change of Economic Variables and Number of Political kigloe Chang**
Countrv&Kxpro

TABLE III - DATA FORBEAR T-l, ONK YEAK BEFORE EXPROPRIATION KVENT
Annual Percentage Change of Economic Variables and Number of Political Regime Changes
Country&Ixpro.Yr]

TABLE IV - DATA FOR YEAR T ,, TWO YEARS BEFORE EXPROPRIATION EVENT
Annual Percent**
Countrv&Expro.Yr

Countrv&Exprc

TABLE VI - DATA FOR YEAR T
,
, FOUR YEARS BEFORE EXPROPRIATION EVENT
Annual Perceotage Changs of Economic Variables and Number of Political Regime Changee
Countrv&Exp
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TAHLE VII
RE3GIME CHANGES AND DIRECTION
Year of Regime Change Change to Right Total
Tg, year of expropriation
T_lf 1 year before exprop.
T_2, 2 years before exprop.
T_3» 3 years before exprop.
T..4, 4 years before exprop.
Total 71
Source: Tables II-VI
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TABLE VIII:
POLITICAL CHARACTER OF EXPROPRIATING REGIME AND LENGTH OF TIME IN
POWER BEFORE EXPROPRIATION EVENT
Country&Expro
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TAELE IX
EXPROPRIATION EVENTS AS A FUNCTION OF TIME FOLLOWING A REGIME CHANGE
Time Following a Regime Change in Years
(fractions counted as whole years)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
10+
Nurber of Expropriation
Events
Source: Table VTI
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CHART I
GRAPH OF TABLE IX
34567789 10
Years After the Regime Change
10+
Source: Table IX
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TAHLE X
AVERAGE ANNUAL GNP/CAPITA GROWTH RATE IN COUNTRIES WITH
SHORT AND LONG TERM REGIMES
Year
TO
T
-l
T
-2
T-3
T_4
In Power 0-2 Yrs.
+2.14
+2.14
+5.45
+5.67
+2.45
In Power 2+ Yrs.
+1.53
+2.89
+2.12
+1.13
+6.91
Total
+1.81
+2.56
+3.68
+3.19
+4.68
Source: Tables II-VT
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TABLE XI
AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF INFLATION IN COUNTRIES WITH
SHORT AND LONG TERM REGIMES
Year
To
T-l
T_2
T
-3
T
-4
In Power 0-2 Yrs.
+9.29
+9.49
+12.60
+10.56
+13.69
In Power 2+ Yrs.
+10.62
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TABLE XII
PERCENTAGE OF COUNTRIES WITH SHORT AND LONG TERM REGIMES SHOWING
AN INCREASE IN NET TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES
Year
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TARLE XIII
PERCENTAGE OF COUNTRIES WITH SHORT AND LONG TERM REGIMES SHOWING
AN INCREASE IN NET FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
Year
x
-2
T-3
T ,
In Power 0-2 Yrs.
45.5
43.5
38.1
52.4
60.0
In Power 2+ Yr3.
41.7
58.3
58.3
65.2
54.5
Total
43.5
51.1
48.9
59.1
57.1
Source: Tables II-VI

TABLE XIV
PERCENTAGE OF COUNTRIES WITH SHORT AND LONG TERM REGIMES SHOWING AN
INCREASE IN NET UNREQUITED TRANSFERS
Year
T
T
-l
T-2
T-3
T
-4
In Power 0-2 Yrs,
61.9
45.5
47.6
57.1
25.0
In Power 2+ Yrs.
50.0
41.7
37.5
43.5
40.9
Total
57.8
43.5
42.2
50.0
33.2
Source: Tables II-VI
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